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This paper investigates relationship between institutional quality and economic 
performance in Pakistan using the Johansen-Juselius cointegration technique and the 
Granger causality test. The study results indicate that Institutions and growth are 
cointegrated and thus exhibit a reliable long run relationship. The Granger causality test 
findings indicate that the causality between Institutions and growth is uni-directional.  
However, there is no short run causality from Institutions to growth and vice versa. 
Therefore, as a policy implication that institutional quality may cause to the sustainable 
increase in country’s income in the long run, and success of any policy could be 
influenced by the soundness of institutions. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Exploring the relationship between economic performance and the quality of domestic 
institutions has been a major area of interest. The better quality of institutions has a positive 
and significant effect on growth and human development and this effect is more vehement for 
long term growth than short term. The role of regulatory institutional capacity also play 
important role for the cross-country variations in economic growth through positive impact 
on total factor productivity. The causality between institutions and economic performance is 
also important issue and studies shows better institutions leads to a higher income rather than 
causation being in the opposite direction. Some studies find that the quality of governance 
and institutions is important in explaining the higher rates of investment through improving 
the climate for capital creation .Other studies reiterated institutional roles in improving 
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international capital flows in particular FDI and portfolio investment. However most of the 
empirical evidence about the relationship between institutions and growth are based on cross-
sectional and cross-country analysis. Quite apart from general methodological flaws relating 
to model specification and econometric procedure, there are two fundamental limitations that 
make results from any cross-country study on the subject rather dubious. First, cross-country 
regression analysis is based on the implicit assumption of “homogeneity” in the observed 
relationship across countries. This is very restrictive assumption. Secondly, given vast 
difference among countries with respect to nature and quality of data, cross-country 
comparison is fraught with danger. These considerations point a need for undertaking 
econometric analysis of individual countries over time in order to build a sound empirical 
foundation for informing the policy debate. There is a rich literature on Solow growth model, 
extended growth model, endogenous growth model and extended endogenous growth model. 
This literature assumes transmission mechanism, distributive policies and institutions, are 
working properly and income is converging to high level. However, in developing countries 
such as Pakistan, this assumption is may not be valid and could be one of the most important 
reasons for low productivity and skewed income distribution.   
The present study makes an early attempt to test empirically the role of institution on 
economic development of Pakistan. However, there is compelling evidence that many 
macroeconomics time series are non-stationary and as a result, OLS estimates using these 
data may produce spurious results. Although by now there exist well-developed techniques 
for handling non-stationary time series data. So far, no attempt has yet been made in Pakistan 
to study the long run causal relationship between institutions and economic performance by 
using well developed econometric techniques. This study employ Johansen-Juselius 
cointegration technique and the Granger causality test to examines the long run causal 
relationship between institutions and economic performance  on annual data for Pakistan 
economy over the period 1984-2006. Earlier studies use data bases and indices which cover 
one or few aspects of the institutional capacity.  For this paper we develop a comprehensive 
index of “institutionalized social technologies” which is build on theoretical framework of 
contract and predatory theories set by North (1981). This index is made up of Risk reducing 
technologies based on contract theory and Anti-Rent seeking technologies based on predatory 
theory of state.  The plan of the paper is as follows:  Section 2 covers review of literature,  
Section 3 presents an overview of quality of institutions in Pakistan; In Section 4, presents the 
model and econometric techniques and data Description; Section 5 presents and analyzes the 
empirical findings. And Section 6 present a concluding summary. 
 
 
2.Review of Literature 
 
North (1990) defines institutions as the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, “the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”. These rules of game can be in 
form of formal institutions like laws and regulations or informal ones which assimilated to 
culture Tabellini (2005) or social capital Putnam & at al. (1993). Some institutions lowers 
transaction cost thereby result in innovation and productivity whereas other institutional 
features impedes information flow, raising information costs and eroding the gains from 
information, and limit entrepreneurial activity. Examples of institutions that stunt economic 
growth include government, police and/or court corruption, excessive taxation and/or 
regulation, unstable and/or inconsistent monetary and fiscal policy. (Frye and Shleifer 1997; 
Johnson, Kaufmann, Zoido-Lobaton 1998; Shleifer and Vishney 1993, 1994; Soto 1989, 
2000;  Rodrik at al. 2003, 2004; Easterly and Levine 2002; Kaufmann and Kraay 2002; 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2005; Knack and Keefer 1995; Mauro 1995; Meon and 
Sekkat 2004; Barro 1997,2000; Sachs and Warner 1995). On distinguishing between kinds of 
institutions, North (1981) proposes two theories, a “contract theory” of the state and a 
“predatory theory” of the state. According to the first theory, the state and associated 
institutions provide the legal framework that enables private contracts to facilitate economic 
transactions hence reducing transaction costs. According to the second, the state is an 
instrument for transferring resources from one group to another. 
Neoclassical growth modelling Solow (1956) predicted economies move toward their steady-
state growth path which means that in the long run, income per capita levels will converge. 
However, lack of empirical support for convergence has presented a major challenge to these 
models. A more refined endogenous growth theory by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) and 
its empirics provides the evidence of „conditional‟‟ convergence, where convergence is 
conditional on factors some of which are related to institutions. This is explained by new 
growth theories as “knowledge spillovers” assumption whereby any sector in less advanced 
countries can catch-up with the current technological frontier whenever it “innovates”. The 
term “innovation” also refers to the adaptation of technologies which in turn depends upon 
the institutional arrangements. As argued by North and Thomas (1973), that far from being 
exogenous, technological changes crucially depend just on the prevailing institutions through 
their impact on incentives and transaction costs: it is these that largely determine how fast, if 
at all, technological changes will actually progress. 
Institutions contributes to growth and development by reducing risk of doing business thus 
preventing diversion of resources and by preventing predatory rent seeking activities thereby 
diverting resource towards innovation.  A society free of diversion, productive units are 
rewarded by the full amount of their production and individual units do not need to invest 
resources in avoiding diversion.  In particular (Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002, 2005) show that 
quality of institutions have a more important effect on long term growth than on short term 
one. Jalilian et al. (2007) emphasises the role of regulatory institutional capacity in 
accounting for cross-country variations in economic growth Méon and Weill (2006) , Olson 
et al. (1998) find evidence suggesting that institutional factors are strongly related to total 
factor productivity. As productivity growth is higher in countries with better institutions and 
quality of governance.  With regards to causal effect  between institutions and economic 
performance , studies like Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2000; Olson et al. 1998; Rodrik 
et al. 2004; Kauffman et al. 2005, p. 38), indicates indicate that a better institutions leads to a 
higher income rather than causation being in the opposite direction. In particular Kauffman 
suggests that a one standard deviation improvement in governance institutions leads to a two 
to threefold difference in income levels in the long run. Acemogu and Johnson (2005) who 
attempted to distinguish between anti-rent seeking institutions and risk-reducing institutions, 
as they termed them as “property rights” and “contracting” institutions respectively. They 
found strong support for the importance of anti-rent seeking institutions on economic 
outcome but In contrast, indicate that the role of risk reducing institutions is more limited.  
The reason they give to this fact is, in absence of formal risk reducing institutions – 
contracting institutions, the gap is filled by private alternative institutional arrangement. Like 
in earlier times when formal institutions of courts and police don‟t exist or ineffective, people 
then resort to dwell in groups where contracts are honoured through informal pressure and 
risk of expulsion from group. Hence their rights are secured in other ways. In contrast, 
protection from rent seeking behaviour relates to the relationship between the state and the 
citizens. When the state have major problems of corruption, inefficiency or no checks on the 
state, on politicians, and on elites, individuals don‟t have a level playing fields and adds to 
uncertainty. In this case, they are also unable to enter into private arrangements to circumvent 
these problems. In regional context, Fernandes and Kraay (2007) employing firm level data 
found the similar evidence that firms in the South Asian countries are able to circumvent 
failures in formal "contracting institutions", by resorting frequently to informal channels such 
as belonging to a business association. Some studies find that the quality of governance and 
institutions is important in explaining the rates of investment, as they suggested they effect 
economic performance through improving the climate for capital creation (Kirkpatrick, 
Parker, & Zhang 2006; World Bank, 2003). Other studies reiterated institutional roles in 
improving international capital flows in particular FDI (Reisen and De Soto 2001; 
Smarzynska and Wei 2000). And portfolio investment Gelos and Wei (2002) 
A number of studies have made attempts to examine institutions  in Pakistan as well in south 
Asian region. Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre (1999), Ahmed (2001)  illustrated 
that  institutions appears to be a significant problem in South Asia. Specially in Pakistan, 
institutional decay has led to poor governance, which has resulted in ad hoc policy-making. 
Instability and unpredictability has discouraged long-term investment and encouraged 
lobbying, corruption, and misuse of power, resulting in frustration and dysfunctional 
behaviour [For details, see DRI/McGraw-Hill (1998)]. [Hussain (1999)]. Asserts weak 
institutions have been used by èlite to extract rents in Pakistan.  Institutional impact on 
poverty is explored in Pakistan (1999), Hassan (2002) Haq and Zia (2009), which shows 
institutions are negatively and significantly correlated with poverty, hence weak institutions 
to increase in poverty in Pakistan. However  in contrast to the popular notion, Studies like 
Shafique and Haq (2006) based on world bank‟s governance indicators, find weak institutions 
do improve welfare of the society but it has negative influence on GDP growth rate. At 
another place, Fernandes and Kraay (2007) and Easterly (2003) in a study suggest that 
Pakistan have per capita incomes that are considerably higher than their very weak 
institutional performance would suggest based on average cross-country relationships. 
 
3. Overview of quality of institutions and economic growth in 
Pakistan  
 
We take index of institutionalized social technology, as well as its sub indices of Risk 
reducing technologies and Anti-rent seeking technologies for measurement of institutional 
quality. Risk reducing technology removes information asymmetry, creates mutual trust and 
hence decreases the risk of creating long term business relationships. It re-price contravention 
activities through increasing risk of getting caught. Anti-Rent seeking technologies plugs in 
predatory opportunities that arise due to gaps or loopholes in ineffective or week institutions, 
creating rents for controlling agents betting them higher return than though innovation hence 
is making society moves from innovative to rent seeking activities. This index specially 
focuses on technologies which helps curb the rent seeking opportunity arising from 
institutions, policies and political system. Table 1 focuses on periodic trends in institutional 
quality and growth. Over all institutional indicators fairly remain stable. They witness stable 
increase in periods of 1984 to 1999. Especially 1996-99 periods witnessed sharp increase in 
institutional quality. But afterwards, institutional index saw a sharp decline but again saw 
some improvements in later periods. On the political front, democratic era of 1988 to1999 
saw a considerably higher institutional quality index then era govern by military 
dictatorships. Era of Transition to civilian democracy in 1988 witnessed sharp increase of 
about 19% in institutional quality especially anti-rent seeking technologies increases by about 
55%, while Era followed by military takeover after 1999 saw a sharp decline of about 31% in 
institutional quality. This trend can also be witnessed from Figure 1. Hence strong political 
institutions do produce a huge impact of other social institutions in the country and reforming 
and strengthening the political institutions become pivotal in economic and social 
development. On the other hand, growth in economy measured by real GDP per capita, 
witnessed a stable increase over the years. However, comparatively higher growth was 
witnessed in era of 1984- 91. In era of 90s, income level became fairly stable, and it sharply 
picked up later in 2000-06 period (Figure 2) Here the overall trend indicate authoritarian rule 
have comparatively higher growth whereas a lower institutional quality. The similar 
assessment is made by SPDC (2000), which shows that while governments under 
authoritarian rule in Pakistan were good for economic growth, they were not necessarily as 
successful in improving human endowment. 
 
Table 1 
Average Periodic Trend in institutional quality and growth 
 
obs RGDPPC IIST RI SII 
1984-87 2163.99 0.456977956 0.412333333 0.501622578 
1988-91 2418.43 0.543300359 0.6415 0.445100719 
1992-95 2574.73 0.54365293 0.570125 0.517180861 
1996-99 2680.8925 0.630186855 0.5821875 0.67818621 
2000-03 2788.5375 0.434945959 0.407270833 0.462621085 
2004-06 3247.29 0.448225958 0.396166667 0.500285249 
 
 
Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
4. The model and econometric techniques and Data Description 
 
4.1 Model Specification and Data Description 
To explore the causality between Institutions and Growth,  
we use the following model 
 
yt = β0 + β1It + β2pt + β2Ot + єt 
 
where yt is real output in year t, It is a measure of institutional quality, pt it is inflation, Ot is 
openness measured by total trade to GDP and єt is an error term. Since the direction of 
causality is not clear we also specify the model 
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Real GDP per Capita
It = β0 + β1yt + β2pt + β2Ot + єt 
Both equations are to be considered as long run, or equilibrium relations. We may, of course, 
have more cointegrating relations involving inflation or trade share as the dependent variable. 
Provided all variables involved are integrated of order one, or I(1), valid economic inferences 
can be drawn only if these relations (or perhaps more, having investment share or inflation as 
dependent variable) are cointegrating relations, otherwise spurious inferences would result.  
Regarding the data, we use Real GDP per capita in real term as a measure of economic 
growth. For the institutional variables we have used recently developed indices by Siddiqui 
and Ahmed (Unpublished) for the measure of institutional quality. We take index of 
institutionalized social technology, as well as its sub indices of Risk reducing technologies 
and Anti-rent seeking technologies for measurement of institutional quality. This index and 
its sub indices are build on theoretical framework of contract and predatory theories set by 
North. Specifically sub index of Risk reducing technologies is based on contract theory 
whereas index of Anti-Rent seeking technologies is based on predatory theory of state. These 
indices are in 0 to 1 ranges where higher values indicating better institutional quality. By the 
nature of this construction, these variables are bounded above and below by random numbers, 
which makes it impossible for the series to be non-stationary. Thus, we transform the index 
using inverse logit function to allow it to vary without limit. Inflation rate is measured using 
the consumer price index. Whereas Trade share in GDP is Total trade (Exports plus Imports)  
as a percentage of GDP. Income and  trade data are taken from Heston and Summers (2009) 
whereas Inflation, are taken from World Development Indicators. Table 2 gives detailed 
information about the variables and their data source whereas descriptive statistics of 
variables used are given in Table 3 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2 
Data Sources and Description 
 
  
Variable 
Name Description   Source 
1 RGDPPC Real GDP per capita at constant price (Laspeyres) 
initial 
Factor 
Heston and Summers 
(2009) 
2 INFCPI Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)  
Macro-
economic 
Stability 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
3 OPEN 
Total trade (Exports plus Imports) as a percentage of GDP. 
(export, import  and GDP figures are expressed in real 
values) Openness 
Heston and Summers 
(2009) 
4 IIST Index Institutionalized Social Technologies Institutions 
 
Siddiqui and Ahmed 
(unpublished) 
 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
RGDPPC IIST WINFCPI OPEN 
 Mean 2619.487 0.5122 7.4730 30.0948 
 Median 2632.580 0.4906 7.8443 29.5600 
 Maximum 3388.570 0.7395 12.3682 38.6100 
 Minimum 2058.170 0.2741 2.9141 26.3000 
 Std. Dev. 335.2862 0.1050 3.1318 3.1742 
 Skewness 0.5038 0.2035 0.0319 1.1306 
 Kurtosis 3.0544 3.0077 1.7241 3.8064 
 Jarque-Bera 0.9759 0.1589 1.5639 5.5235 
 Probability 0.6139 0.9236 0.4575 0.0632 
 Sum 60248.1900 11.7809 171.8781 692.1800 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 2473170 0.2426 215.7741 221.6568 
 Observations 23.0000 23.0000 23.0000 23.0000 
 
 
4.2 Econometric Methodology 
The following sequential procedure will be adopted. 
Step 1: Unit root test and order of integration 
we have used Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test to test the stationarity of variables. For 
time series data, ADF test is a test for unit root. Strong negative numbers of unit root has 
rejected the null hypothesis that there is unit root at some level of confidence. Following 
equation check the stationarity of time series data used in the study:  
Δy = β0 + β1t + Φ yt-1 + αi Ʃ  Δy t-1 + єt 
Where єt is white noise error term, 
These tests have determined that whether the estimates of Φ  are equal to zero or not. Dickey 
and Fuller (1979) provided cumulative distribution of the ADF statistics by showing that if 
the calculate-ratio (value) of the coefficient is less than critical value from Fuller table, then y 
is said to be stationary. However, this test is not reliable for small sample data set due to its 
size and power properties (Dejong et al, 1992 & Harris, 2003). For small sample data set, 
these tests seem to over-reject the null hypotheses when it is true and accept it when it is 
false. Two new tests, i.e., Dicky-Fuller Generalized Least Square (DF-GLS) and Ng-Perron 
could solve the problems of data size and power properties. 
 
Step 2: Cointegration analysis  
The second step is to identify whether all the variables that are included in the system are 
cointegrated, i.e. tied in a long run relationship. A widely used approach is Johansen‟s (1988) 
and Johansen and Jesulius (1990) procedure based on  „Maximum Likelihood method‟ and 
„eigen value statistics‟ to confirm the existence of long run relationship among all tested 
variables. Cointegration is said to exist if the values of computed statistics are significantly 
different from zero. Thus, variables if found to be cointegrated,  implies that there exist a 
linear, stable and long-run relationship among variables, such that the disequilibrium errors 
would tend to fluctuate around zero mean. This means that variables tend to move together to 
its steady state path in the long run. 
 
 
Step 3 Vector Error-Correction Modeling (VECM) 
If a number of variables are found to be cointegrated with at least one cointegrating vector, 
then there always exists a corresponding error-correction representation which implies that 
changes in the dependent variable can be formulated as a function of the level disequilibrium 
in the cointegration relationship and fluctuation in other explanatory variables. In other words 
the error-correction term in the VECM provides additional channel for the detection of 
Granger causality. Thus third stage includes conducting standard Granger causality tests 
augmented with a lagged error-correction term. The Granger (1986) (1988) representation 
theorem suggests that there will be Granger causality either unidirectional or bi-directional in 
at least one direction if there exists co-integration relationship among the variables provided 
the variables are integrated order of one. Engle-Granger (1987) cautioned that if the Granger 
causality test is conducted at first difference through vector auto regression (VAR) method 
than it will be misleading in the presence of co-integration. Therefore, an inclusion of an 
additional variable to the VAR method such as the error-correction term would help us to 
capture the long-run relationship. The residuals from the long run estimates can be used as 
the error correction term (ECT) to explain the short run dynamic. 
The error correction model representation of the Granger causality model is given in 
following equations. 
Δyt =  c + Ʃ θi Δyt-i + Ʃ βi ΔIt-i + Ʃ Φi Δpt-i + Ʃ αi ΔOt-i + λ(yt-1 - It-1 - pt-1 - i Δpt-i Ot-i) + єt 
 
ΔIt =  c + Ʃ θi Δyt-i  + Ʃ βi ΔIt-i + Ʃ Φi Δpt-i + Ʃ αi ΔOt-i + λ(yt-1 - It-1 - pt-1 - i Δpt-i Ot-i) + єt 
 
Where Δ is a difference operator, λ representing the coefficient error-correction term derived 
from long-run co-integrating relationship, c is constant and єt   are serially uncorrelated 
random disturbance term with zero mean. Through the ECT, the VECM provide new 
directions for Granger causality to appear. Long-run causality can be revealed through the 
significance of the lagged ECTs by t test since it contains long-run cointegration information 
between  the variables, because it is derived from the long-term cointegration relationship(s), 
while F-statistic or Wald test investigate short-run causality through the significance of joint 
test with an application of sum of lags of explanatory variables in the model. The non-
significance of both the t-and F-test in the system indicates econometric exogeneity of 
dependent variable. The purpose of the VECM is to focus on the short run dynamics while 
making them consistent with long run solution.  
 
5. Empirical Results and Analysis 
The Johansen co-integration method and vector error-correction model technique has been 
used in order to examine the long run and the short run dynamic of system respectively.
3
 
Prior to testing the long run co-integration relation, it is necessary to establish the order of 
integration presented. To this end, an Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test with the null 
hypothesis of unit root, was carried out on the time series levels and difference forms. The 
critical value for this test is provided by MacKinnon (1991). 
The results are given in table 4 and as this table shows, all the variables have a unit root in 
their levels and are stationary in their first difference. 
 
Table 4 
Unit Root Estimation (Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF)) 
 
Variables 
No Trend Trend 
LEVEL 
 
FIRST DIFFERENCE LEVEL 
 
FIRST DIFFERENCE 
t-Statistic   lag t-Statistic   lag t-Statistic   lag t-Statistic   lag 
IIST -2.447474 1 (-3.896221)*** 1 -2.487936 1 (-3.842135)** 1 
rgdppc 1.484928 0 (-5.016628)*** 0 -2.451442 2 (-5.18409)*** 0 
infcpi (-3.809795)*** 1 (-5.967625)*** 0 (-3.741659)** 1 (-5.927934)*** 0 
Open -1.033062 0 (-4.698918)*** 0 -2.026745 0 (-4.586755)*** 0 
 *MacKinnon (1991) one-sided test. 
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 The johansen-Juselius (1990) can find multiple cointegrating vectors; Engle-Granger approach has several limitations in 
the case of more than one cointegration vector. 
 
 The lag order has been selected based on Schwarz Information Criterion. Then we explored 
the stationarity evidence of DF-GLS, and Ng-Perron test statistics. DF-GLS and Ng-Perron 
are more power full and suggestive tests than 
ADF test as already been explained in theoretical background. The statistics are given in 
Table 5 and 6. As it shows, institution variable in stationary at level, but when trend is 
included it becomes stationary at first difference. Rest of the variable also become stationary 
at first difference. Hence we can safely conclude the presence of unit root and stationarity of 
the first differences; Thus these variables are integrated of order one I(1). 
Table 5 
Unit Root Estimation (Dicky Fuller GLS(ERS)) 
 
 
Variables 
No Trend Trend 
LEVEL 1st Difference LEVEL 1st Difference 
t-Statistic   Lag t-Statistic   lag t-Statistic   lag t-Statistic   lag 
IIST (-2.003690)**  1 -1.078435 2 -2.416822 1 (-3.592467)*** 1 
Rgdppc 1.039024 2 (-2.67745)*** 1 -2.451442 2 (-5.18409)*** 0 
Infcpi -1.320502 5 (-2.562337)** 5 -2.850557 0 (-5.952165)*** 0 
Open -0.998304 0 (-4.584298)*** 0 -2.191557 0 (-4.840034)*** 0 
*MacKinnon (1991) 
 The optimal lags for conducting the test were determined by SIC (Schwarz information criteria).   
Null Hypothesis:  has a unit root   
 
Table 6 
Unit Root Estimation (Ng-Perron test) 
 
Variables 
No Trend 
LEVEL FIRST DIFFERENCE 
   MZa    MZt    MSB    MPT LAG(SIC)    MZa    MZt    MSB    MPT LAG(SIC) 
IIST (-6.21988)* (-1.75940)* 0.28287 (3.95179)* 1 -2.13126 -1.02687 0.48182 11.4451 2 
rgdppc 0.56815 0.2691 (0.47363)*** (19.5896)*** 2 (-20.8428)*** (-3.14566)*** (0.15092)*** (1.46188)*** 0 
infcpi (-10.0383)** (-2.22875)** (0.22203)** (2.48616)** 0 (-21.545)*** (-3.28202)*** (0.15233)*** (1.13761)*** 0 
open -2.39524 -0.76641 (0.31997)*** (8.42842)*** 0 (-10.4354)** (-2.19724)** (0.21056)** (2.67157)** 0 
Variables 
Trend 
LEVEL FIRST DIFFERENCE 
   MZa    MZt    MSB    MPT LAG(SIC)    MZa    MZt    MSB    MPT LAG(SIC) 
IIST -8.069 -2.00342 0.24829 11.3065 1 (-15.5511)** (-2.75605)** (0.17723)* (6.04418)* 1 
rgdppc (-73.326)*** (-5.92471)*** (0.0808)*** (1.79406)*** 2 (-21.4138)** (-3.25058)** (0.1518)*** (4.38586)** 0 
infcpi -11.567 -2.40167 0.20763 7.89492 0 (-21.7168)** (-3.29231)** (0.1516)** (4.21364)** 0 
open -6.91945 -1.79855 0.25993 13.2149 0 -10.2728 -2.13967 0.20828 9.4107 0 
*Ng-Perron (2001, Table 1) 
The optimal lags for conducting the test were determined by SIC (Schwarz information criteria). 
Null Hypothesis:  has a unit root 
Spectral Estimation Method: GLS-detrended AR    
 
Given the common integration properties of variables under consideration the next stage to 
test the presence of multilevel cointegration in the multi dimensional VAR model 
(RGDPPC,IIST,INFCPI and OPEN) by employing the johansen(1988) and johansen and 
juselius(1990) procedure using the trace statistic and maximal eigenvalue test. The results of 
the cointegration tests are given in Table 7. There is evidence that the results are often 
sensitive to choice of lag lengths. In literature there exist a number of suggested methods for 
choosing the lag orders. Here an Akaike information criterion table 8 has been used. This 
suggests two lags of each variable. 
 
Table 7 
Johansen’s Test For Multiple Cointegration Vectors 
 
Null 
Hypothesis 
  
Lag 
  
Trace 
Statistic()1 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic()1 
  
Result at 5% level of 
both statistics Eigenvalue 
r = 0* 2 0.904324 (97.11535)*** ( 46.93567)*** co-integrated 
r ≤ 1* 2 0.74257 (50.17968)*** ( 27.14016)*** co-integrated 
r ≤ 2 2 0.507191 ( 23.03952)*** ( 14.15267)* not co-integrated 
r ≤ 3* 2 0.358755 ( 8.886859)*** ( 8.886859)*** co-integrated 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level and both tests 
1 MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
 
 
Table 8 
Lag order selection criteria for VAR 
 
K 1 2 
 Log likelihood -113.7897 -85.81825 
 Akaike information 
criterion 13.50379 12.98183 
 Schwarz criterion 14.89648 15.17244 
 
The λtrace statistic indicating that there exist four cointegrating vector, with null hypothesis of no, 
one, two and three cointegration among the variables, the trace statistic cointegrating vector exceeds 
the 99 per cent critical value of the λtrace statistic (critical value is 30.45), it is possible to reject the 
null hypothesis, in the favour of the general alternative r≥3  (Table 6). Similarly, On the other hand, 
λmax statistic reject the null hypothesis as the calculated value λmax in null hypotheses of no, one and 
three conintegration exceeds the 99 per cent critical value (23.65). λmax in null hypotheses of two 
cointegration exceed 90 per cent critical value. The finding of cointegration has several implications. 
First, the presence of cointegration vectors shows that there exists a long run relationship between the 
variables. Second, this evidence of cointegration between these  variables rules out spurious 
correlations and also implies at least one direction of Granger causality. The Normalized 
Cointegration vector in Table 9 indicates that there is a long run positive relationship between 
institutions and growth. Also there is a positive relationship between openness and growth, and 
negative relationship between inflation and growth as expected.  
  
Table 9 
Normalized Co-integration vector 
RGDPPC C IISTt-1 INFCPIt-1 OPENt-1 
1 4504.567 -1830.188 110.5259 -226.5489 
    (-0.85794) ( 8.72397)*** (-13.2214)*** 
 t-stats in parentheses 
*** significant at 1% level 
 
Regression analysis deals with dependence of one variable on the other variables; it does not 
necessarily imply causation. In other words existence of a relationship between variables 
does not prove causality or direction of influence. Engle and Granger (1987) demonstrated 
that once a number of variables are found to be cointegrated, there always exists a 
corresponding error correction representation which implies that changes in the dependent 
variable are a function of level of disequilibrium in the cointegration relation (capture by the 
error-correction model) specifies that the first differences of all I(1) variables are function of 
the lagged differences of all these terms in addition to lagged equilibrium error terms. In this 
respect, since the error-correction term is stationary, all variables in this model are also 
stationery. This implies that OLS standard errors will also consistent and efficient. 
 
 
 
Table 10 
Vector Error Correction Models 
 
Dependent Variable ΔRGDPPC  (Eq. 1) ΔIIST (Eq. 2) 
Independent Variables Coeficients, (t-Statistics in paranthesis) 
ECT t-1 -0.20042 1.54E-05 
[-7.08614]*** [ 0.89197] 
ΔRGDPPCt-1 -0.133217 0.0000436 
[-0.84784] [ 0.45390] 
ΔRGDPPCt-2 0.124019 0.0000695 
[ 0.65149] [ 0.59693] 
ΔIISTt-1 -650.6761 0.353231 
[-1.23986] [ 1.10063] 
ΔIISTt-2 646.2234 -0.000614 
[ 1.65096] [-0.00256] 
ΔINFCPIt-1 14.76375 0.000721 
[ 3.09334]** [ 0.24702] 
ΔINFCPIt-2 5.739393 -0.005459 
[ 1.35058] [-2.10060]* 
ΔOPENt-1 -36.93979 0.00376 
[-4.49780]*** [ 0.74861] 
ΔOPENt-2 -28.09337 0.008295 
[-4.46130]*** [ 2.15413]* 
C 91.78006 -0.012028 
[ 6.44991]*** [-1.38223] 
R-squared 
 Adj. R-squared 
 F-statistic 
 Log likelihood 
 Akaike AIC 
 Schwarz SC 
Durbin-Watson 
stat 
 
0.894539 
0.799623 
9.424608 
-87.92084 
9.792084 
10.28995 
2.324982 
 
0.540216 
0.126411 
1.305483 
60.06964 
-5.006964 
-4.509097 
1.635949 
 
 
From the estimated results reported in Table 10, it is evident from the table that error 
correction term is only significant in equation (1). So Institutional quality Granger causes 
growth in the long run. The error correction term is not significant in equation (2). Thus, 
Growth does not cause institutional quality in long run. The results indicate that the long run 
causality between growth and institutions is uni-directional: There is only one-way long run 
causality from institutions  to growth; however, no long run causality, in the Granger sense, 
was found in opposite direction. This indicates that institutions causes economic growth in 
Pakistan.   
To determine the dunamics of shrot run causality, we took F-statistic or Wald test of sum of 
lags of explanatory variables in the model The results of bivariate Granger causality tests are 
in Table 11. 
Table 11 
Summary of Bi-variate Granger causality tests 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
F Statistics Coeficient and t-Statistics 
ΔYRGDPPC2t-n ΔIISTt-n ECTt-1 
Δ 
YGDPPC2 - 1.716399 (50.21337)*** -0.201146 [-7.05326]*** 
Δ IIST 0.395241 - 0.795603 0.000066 [ 0.87015] 
 
The estimated F Statistics of joint test shows that lags of Institutions are insignificant in 
growth equation (1) equation and lags of growth are also insignificant in institutions equation 
(2). Thus there is no short run causality from institutions to growth and vice versa.   
Table 12 
Diagnostic Tests 
 
VEC Models 
E(1) E(2) 
Δ GDPPC Δ IIST 
Functional Form
1 
0.352350 (0.5674) 1.185570 (0.3045) 
Autocorrelation
2 
5.503359 (0.3201) 0.437426 (0.8352) 
Normality
3 
1.197621(0.549465) 0.886806 (0.641848) 
Heteroskedasticity
4 
1.890833 (0.1675) 1.322892  (0.3331) 
1
Ramsey RESET Test 
2
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM (langrene Multiplyer) Test F-
statistic (for the joint significance of all lagged residuals) with 9 lag 
inclusion based on AIC 
3
Jarque-Bera(JB) Residual Normality Tests. 
4
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test 
  
 
Diagnostic tests for serial correlation, heteroscedisticity and functional form are conducted 
and the results are shown in Table 12. These tests show that short run model passes through 
all diagnostic tests. The results also indicated that there is no evidence of serial correlation 
among variables because functional form of model is well specified and there is no evidence 
for white heteroscedisticity as in each case the null hypothesis could not be rejected at 
conventional 5% level of significance, implying thereby that our results are statistically free 
from any specification problems. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have examined the question of whether Quality of institutions, Granger-
cause economic growth or vice versa. This paper has examined the long run relationship 
between institutions and growth in Pakistan using annual data for the period 1984-2006. The 
empirical investigation consists of: (1) the application of cointegration analysis to ascertain 
the long run relationship between institutions and growth (2) the determination of the 
direction of causality among the variables in the context of vector error correction model. 
Our results indicate that institutions and growth are cointegrated and thus exhibit a reliable 
long run relationship. The results indicate that the causality between institutions and growth 
is uni-directional: There is only one-way long run causality from institutions to growth; 
however, no long run causality, in the Granger sense, was found in opposite direction. 
Similarly, there is no short run causality from institutions to growth and vice versa. The most 
important implication of our findings is a policy recommendation: If policy makers want to 
promote growth, then attention should be focused on long run policies, for example the 
creation of sound political and social institutions that minimize rent seeking opportunities and 
reduce risk of doing businesses. However its positive impact could be felt in long run, as in 
short run, it could cause adverse impact in form of curbing opportunities of rent seekers. 
However the notion of increased economic growth would lead to strong institutions in long 
run cannot be accepted. Hence sustainable growth could only occur in the ambit of sound 
social and political institutions. As in their absence, even best policies for development and 
attracting investment might fail as no incentive can balance the huge business risk that could 
arise if property rights are not secured and contract enforcement is week. Also menses of 
corruption and nepotism divert any policy incentives given to entrepreneurs towards rent 
seekers making economy stuck in structural rigidities making any policy ineffective.  
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